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ARGUMENT
REPLY AND REBUTTAL

A new trial should be granted t0 the appellants.

1.

Most jury

trials are

unique from one another. Points of law remain similar for the

judge t0 use and 0r apply with the assistance 0f the jury. However, every jury
different._

At the conclusion of this jury

trial in the

trial is

case at bar, the plaintiffs/appellants

requested a

new trial based upon

law

standard indicating that a judge must exercise discretion based upon

fairly

is

I.R.C.P. 59

and the factors contained

therein.

The

case

perceived errors 0f law, passion 0r prejudice from the jury and/or other irregularities.

The
damages
“
to

district

judge ruled in his decision, 0n one 0f the issues involving general

as follows:

Accordinglv, the court ﬁnds the disparate award 0f $1,000 t0 Blackeagle appears

be given under the inﬂuence of passion 0r preiudice”. R.
Passion 0r prejudice

found

this

is

p. 236.

a key element 0f any request for a

new

trial.

The court

element in a portion 0f its decision. Appellants have pointed t0 irregularities in

the evidence that are very obvious

upon an examination 0f the

transcript, exhibits

and

record as cited in the opening brief. Those irregularities of fact 0n special damages
(medical, vehicle, health care, lost income) were set forth in detail in the appellants’

opening

“Our

brief.

prior cases of Sanchez

v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986), Quick v.
111
Idaho
P.2d
1187 (1986), and Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d
727
Crane,
759,
575 (l 979), provide that an additur or a remittitur may only be granted as an alternative t0

the granting 0f a
(1988).”

new

trial.

See also Smallwood

v.

Dick, 114 Idaho 860, 761 P.2d 1212

Howes

v.

Fultz, 115

Idaho 681, 769 P.2d 558, (1989).

“In other words, the
trial as

trial

an alternative,”

The respondent

judge can grant an additur 0r remittitur only by offering a new

Id.

At

relies

687.

upon the 1985 case 0f

v.

Scott,

108 Idaho 506, 700 P.2d 128

(Idaho App. 1985) for the proposition that the “non-moving party” has total right for the
acceptance 0r denial of an additur. The court in Scott gives that privilege t0 the non-

moving party. In that

case, the court 0f appeals granted a remitter

0n the compensatory

damages and an additur 0n the punitive damages. The court granted a new
t0 the

trial subject

non-moving party accepting the additur and remitter.
In the 1989 case by this court

ofHowes

v.

Fultz, 115

Idaho 681, 769 P.2d 558, (1989),

this court

found that the court did not found “passion 0r prejudice” and denied a new

trial; but,

held that an additur 0r remitter

granting of an

remedy

a

is

new trial.”

new

It is clear

may

only be granted “as an alternative t0 the

that an additur

is

only an alternative and the primary

trial.

Appellants urge this court to accept the language 0f Howes t0 the exclusion of Scott.

The

trial

court did not allow the moving party, the appellants, the opportunity 0f

accepting the additur t0 the exclusion 0f a

new

trial.

Appellants desire a

new trial. The

court gave total control 0f the additur t0 the respondent.

2.

Respondent

is

incorrect in asserting that the factual

preserved in the opening

brief.

and

legal issues are not

On
in the

each element of the lack 0f evidence 0r irregularities by the jury, there are

opening brief t0 the record 0r transcript.

It

cites

must be remembered that the

respondent did not provide any defense 0r rebuttal t0 the non-contested evidence 0f the
appellants.

The only

reliance

by the respondents was cross-examination which did not

impeach 0r discredit the monetary amounts testiﬁed 0r shown by exhibit of the appellants.
This argument

-

is

Liability:

a total “red herring” submitted by the respondent.

opening brief pp. 10-11; footnotes 13-15.

-Unrebutted vehicle damages: Opening brief pp. 12, 13-14, 16: Footnote 17, 20, 21,
22, 28; see also,

Dvet v. McKinlev, 139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236 (2003).

-Inc0me damages: Opening brief pp.

12, 15, 16; Footnote 23,

29

-Medical costs: Opening brief pp. 12-13, 14, 15, 16; Exhibit A, Exhibits 13, 14, 15,
16, 17

and

18; Footnote 24, 26

-General Damages: (discussed above).

-Depreciati0n: none should occur after 7.5 years.

should have been at the date 0f the

For the respondent
fabrication

and

fallacy.

collision.

The value 0f the motor

vehicle

Pp. 10-11; footnote 16.

to say that the issues

were not adequately preserved

is

a total

3.

The

issue regarding insurance.

In the opening brief 0f the appellants,

it

was never suggested that

I.R.E. 411 be

removed or done away with from usage. The respondent misinterprets the argument.

What is urged upon

this appellate court is there

when insurance can be mentioned. At page

court during a jury trial of speciﬁc instances

22 0f the appellants opening brief it

is

should be an addition to Rule 411 to the

suggested that the respondent was merely a “prop”.

His health and inability t0 understand the proceedings

were

cited in the transcript

and record

prohibits the mention 0f insurance.
cited in the case

law contained

and allowances should be made
mentioned. This case
the

is

opening

t0 the

alleged. Footnotes 45

to cite t0 the health

The reasoning

in the

is

brief.

and 46

and the jury instruction that

for this prohibition

is

understood as

However, the rule should be examined

judge t0 make rulings when insurance can be

the perfect example 0f the appellants being given an injustice for

sympathy and health 0f the elderly respondent.

Actual bias

is

alleged t0 have existed

the real party in interest, to-wit: insurance.
rule but believe that actual

and

real bias

ambulatory respondent. (See footnote 47

The

This

by the

The

inability t0

be truthful and honest of

appellants have not said d0

away with the

was a by-product 0f a severely aged and nonat

page 49 0f the transcript).

appellants ask for reform. Nothing more.

is

another factor t0 be considered in the request for

manner and not standing

alone.

new

trial in

a collective

The due process argument.

4.

The appellants have
respondent.

was argued

It

set forth the inability to call the

at trial that

IME

expert retained by the

n0 contact can be made with the respondent’s

expert and that subpoena of this witness was out-of-state. Yet the appellants were forced
t0 the I.M.E. in

Spokane

t0

complete discover. I.R.C.P. 26 does not

the subpoena 0f the other party’s expert.

by the
this

plaintiff was

make

a provision for

A motion, ﬁled by the defendant and replied t0

never considered by the court. The appellants/plaintiffs tried t0 bring

matter to the attention of the court and argued that they were denied due process.

This issue

is

fully discussed in the

opening

allow the subpoena of evidentiary experts.

maximum
status. It

An example

medical improvement. That does not

means

that

is

as

good as the patient

is

Rule 26 needs

brief.

mean

is

be corrected t0

the I.M.E. states the

the patient

going to

t0

get.

is

back

work

to the pre—injury

Counsel for the

defendant/respondent argued t0 the jury that the appellants were healthy. The appellants

were prejudiced. This
a collective

5.

another “factor” t0 be considered in the request for a

manner and not standing

The

The
brief

is

new trial in

alone.

appellants stand bV their opening brief on I.R.C.P. 59

and the

subdivisions.

appellants have nothing to add that has not been stated in their opening

and d0 not respond

t0 the respondent’s

arguments.

6.

Attornev

fees

and

costs.

Idaho follows the American Rule wherein there must

exist a statutory 0r

contractual basis in awarding fees. Respondent cites I.C. §12-121 for the proposition that
appellants have ﬁled the matter frivolously or without foundation. I.R.C.P. 54 (e) (2)

contains the language 0f pursued frivolously, unreasonably 0r without foundation.

The
10st

factual matters concerning the health care amounts, the vehicle cost, the

wages, the general damages

all

proper foundation. The court even

indicate that the matter before this court

states

offset

new

trial.

insurance proceeds received by the appellants for

vehicle damages. In addition, the appellants request changes t0 I.R.E. 411

The

appellants did not ask reversal 0n these rules but rather review

The respondent

is

with

0n general damages that the jury acted under

passion or prejudice. Appellant believes the factors, overall, entitle a

Furthermore, the court cannot

is

and I.R.C.P.

26.

and modiﬁcation.

not entitled t0 fees 0r costs.

CONCLUSION
The respondent’s

brief does not set forth any arguments that

excuse the requests of the appellants in their opening brief.
request a

new trial and the

As

would change 0r

such, the appellants

denial 0f any requests of the respondent.

Dated

this 16th

day 0f September, 2019.

/s/ Robin D. Dunn
Robin D. Dunn

Attorney for Appellants
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